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Developing Countries: A Comparative 
Analysis of Welfare Regimes in the 
South  
Abstract 
This paper explores the prospects for future pro-poor reforms to welfare regimes 
in the ‘South’ through an analysis of the development of Southern welfare regimes 
in the past.  Esping-Andersen’s approach to the analysis of distribution is 
inadequate in Southern conditions primarily due to its neglect of the ways in which 
states influence distribution through shaping the development or economic growth 
path.  Even if we narrow our analysis to the provision of income security, Esping-
Andersen’s ‘three worlds’ typology is less useful in the South than an alternative 
typology that distinguishes between ‘agrarian’, ‘inegalitarian corporatist’ and 
‘redistributive’ welfare regimes.  The ‘redistributive’ regimes are those that entail 
significant social assistance, i.e. provision for a minimum cash income, at least for 
specified categories of ‘deserving’ poor, that is not dependent on past 
contributions.  These (rare) regimes have their origins in both reform from above 
(pre-emptive action by elites concerned with the social, economic and political 
problems posed by poverty) or below, following democratisation.  In most cases, 
the prerequisites for reform are deagrarianisation (and the collapse of kin-based 
poverty alleviation) and the limited development of formal contributory welfare 
systems in the formal sector of the economy.  Well-developed insurance systems 
can easily impede the development of social assistance.  The electoral strength of 
poor citizens not covered by social insurance is a crucial factor in most cases, 
especially recent ones. 
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1. Introduction 
The word ‘crisis’ has been widely used in discussions of welfare states and 
regimes in the late twentieth century.  ‘Almost all advanced industrial democracies 
cut entitlements in some programs in this period’, summarise Huber and Stephens 
in their book Development and Crisis of the Welfare State (2001: 1).  In the 
developing world, also, a key World Bank study (1994) was entitled Averting the 
Old-Age Crisis, and commentators widely charged that the World Bank was 
imposing cuts in the form of the Chilean ‘neo-liberal’ model on countries across 
the South.  But it is now clear that in the North, it is politically difficult to roll back 
substantially the public provision of welfare (Pierson, 1994, 2000; Huber and 
Stephens, 2001) whilst across much of the South, pressures to expand welfare 
provision have grown.  It is true that the Chilean/World Bank model of privatising 
the contributory pension system has been extended to other parts of Latin America 
(including, between 1993 and 1997 alone, Peru, Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, 
Bolivia and Mexico) and post-Communist Eastern Europe and central Asia 
(including Hungary, Poland and Kazakhstan). At the same time, however, welfare 
provision in some other parts of the South (including Brazil and Mexico; South 
Africa, Namibia and Botswana; India and Nepal; Hong Kong, Taiwan and South 
Korea) has been extended to the poor, especially through social assistance schemes 
or other moves in the direction of a guaranteed or ‘basic’ income.  In some 
settings, even the Chilean/World Bank model might entail an extension of welfare 
coverage to a larger proportion of the poor.  Whatever the validity of criticisms of 
the Chilean/World Bank model, the end of the twentieth century was probably a 
period of unprecedented expansion in public cash transfers to the very poor in the 
South as a whole. 
Is it possible to discern clear patterns in the ways in which states have responded at 
the end of the twentieth century and start of the twenty-first to the evolving social 
and political pressures of poverty, inequality and risk?  Why do some states adopt 
expansionary reforms whilst others retrench?  Answers to these kinds of questions 
applied to the countries of the North typically employ a variant of Esping-
Andersen’s typology of different ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’ (for the original 
typology, see Esping-Andersen, 1990).  Esping-Andersen identified three distinct 
patterns of state intervention in the advanced capitalist countries of the North 
(including Australia and New Zealand).  In each case, the state intervened through 
social and (to a lesser extent) labour-market policies to reduce inequality (both 
between individuals and across the life-cycle), but the form of that intervention 
differed in terms of the scale of public expenditure and the extent to which the 
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state displaced the market and family in determining the incomes and welfare of its 
citizens.  At the end of the twentieth century, these different clusters of states 
responded differently to fiscal, demographic and political pressures (Esping-
Andersen, 1999, 2002).  Path dependence was not rigid and immutable, but the 
conditions that produced distinctive welfare regimes and the effects of the different 
regimes themselves certainly influenced the ways in which they later evolved. 
Can a comparative, historical analysis of the development of ‘welfare’ systems in 
the South also inform an analysis of contemporary reforms and even the prospects 
for further reform in this poorer and less studied part of the world?  Unfortunately, 
typologies of ‘welfare capitalism’ are largely limited to the countries of the North, 
and the constituent elements of ‘welfare capitalism’ in the South are somewhat 
different to those of the North (at least as analysed by Esping-Andersen).   
In this paper I review, firstly, the existing literature on states and distribution in the 
North and South.  I then analyse four different approaches to the provision of 
welfare in the South in the twentieth century.  Two of these share sufficient key 
features that we can combine them and identify three different ‘worlds’ of welfare 
capitalism in the South: an agrarian world, one that I clumsily term ‘inegalitarian 
corporatist’, and a redistributive one.  In practice, elements of two or even all three 
of these are combined in the real worlds of welfare capitalism in the South, but in 
greatly differing proportions.  I pay special attention to the third, or ‘redistributive’ 
world, that is defined by the provision of social assistance to citizens, at least when 
they fall into ‘deserving’ categories of the poor.  The final part of the paper 
examines some of the social – and political – origins of these redistributive 
regimes, i.e. of social assistance in the South, paying particular attention to the 
moments and conditions in which regimes chose redistributive rather than agrarian 
or corporatist options.  The paper ends with some speculation as to how these 
different approaches might evolve in the near future, paying particular attention to 
the prospects for radical pro-poor reform, towards a basic income. 
This paper entails work-in-progress, primarily because a wider range of data needs 
to be collated and analysed.  Ideally, an enquiry of this sort would combine the 
historical approach of (say) Barrington Moore, analysing telling case-studies, with 
more quantitative analysis of cross-national data.  The combination would be 
comparable to, say, projects such as Rueschemeyer et al.’s study of 
democratisation or Esping-Andersen’s own Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.  
Collating historical statistics on the South is no easy task, however, and much 
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more work is required.  The evidence in this data therefore involves primarily the 
preliminary analysis of case-studies, and presents little quantitative cross-national 
data. 
2. States, Markets and Distribution in North and 
South 
Esping-Andersen identifies different forms (or ‘worlds’) of ‘welfare capitalism’ in 
the advanced capitalist countries according to the ways in which the state affects 
distribution through a combination of social policies (including especially the 
public provision of welfare through social insurance or social assistance) and 
labour-market policies.  His 1990 study was organised around the concept of 
‘welfare-state regimes’.  Use of the term ‘regime’ was intended to emphasise the 
relationships between social policies, employment and the social structure in 
general (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 2).  In later work, he prefers the simpler term 
‘welfare regime’, which reduces the emphasis on the state: ‘A welfare regime can 
be defined as the combined, interdependent way in which welfare is produced and 
allocated between state, market and family’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 34-5).  
Esping-Andersen considers also labour-market policies, primarily with respect to 
the maintenance of full employment.  Full employment (during the Golden Age of 
post-war capitalism) meant that the public provision of welfare could be largely 
confined to the young (through schooling), the elderly (through old-age pensions) 
and the sick (through the public health system).  Unemployment was contained 
through Keynesian macro-economic policies and public sector employment 
policies (which increased the demand for labour) and through social and tax 
policies that affected labour supply.  Such policies constituted different kinds of 
‘labour market regime’, each corresponding to a different kind of ‘welfare-state 
regime’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
The three ‘worlds’ of welfare capitalism are characterised by their ‘welfare-state’ 
and ‘labour market’ regimes.  ‘Liberal’ welfare regimes entail modest financial 
provision to targeted (generally means-tested) individuals in a limited array of 
situations.  Public provision is residual in that the state only fills gaps left by the 
market, but its targeting means that it is nonetheless redistributive.  The modal 
liberal welfare regime is the USA.  By contrast, the social democratic welfare 
regime is much more generous, universal and aspires to cover (i.e. socialise) all 
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risks, with the result that it is much more redistributive and egalitarian.  The state 
actively assumes roles – such as child care – played hitherto by the family, and 
seeks to minimise the role played by the market.  Full employment in these social 
democratic regimes entails very high participation rates, not just low 
unemployment rates.   
The social democratic regimes are mostly in Scandinavia, with Sweden treated as 
the modal regimes (although Goodin et al. (1999) use the Netherlands as the 
modal social democratic regime).  The conservative welfare regimes of continental 
Europe (Austria, France, Germany and Italy) share some features with each of the 
other two kinds of welfare regime. Like the social democratic regimes, they are 
generous.  But they are unequally generous, with differentiated benefits; support is 
‘mutualist’ rather than redistributive.  The basis is insurance, not assistance. These 
regimes emphasise the roles played by families: public policies buttress rather than 
undermine familial roles.  Women are discouraged from working, so that full 
employment entails a low participation rate.  Each of these regimes has its origins 
in different political and ideological contexts: liberal regimes where liberal 
traditions were strong, and liberty was the fundamental value; social democratic 
regimes where politics revolved around class and social equality was the 
fundamental value; and conservative regimes where strong corporatist or Catholic 
traditions were strong (and liberal and socialist traditions weak), and the 
fundamental value was social cohesion (Goodin et al., 1999).   
Table 1 shows the key characteristics of each of Esping-Andersen’s regimes.  The 
degree of ‘decommodification’ refers to the extent to which the state provides 
income to citizens as a right independently of the market value of their labour as a 
commodity.  Esping-Andersen also refers to ‘defamilialisation’, i.e. the extent to 
which the state assumes roles played by close kin (such as care for children and the 
elderly). 
The final row of Table 1 reflects the extent of direct redistribution through taxes 
and transfers.  Esping-Andersen himself is less concerned with this, but other 
scholars have paid it careful attention, using cross-national data from the 
Luxemburg Income Study.  Korpi and Palme (1998) showed that there was a close 
relationship between the size of the budget for redistribution (i.e. the public 
welfare budget) and the extent of income redistribution through transfers and 
direct taxation (measured through the reduction in the Gini coefficient).  The social 
democratic welfare regimes tended to spend more and redistribute more than the 
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conservative welfare regimes of continental Europe, which in turn tended to spend 
and redistribute more than the liberal welfare regimes (see also Huber and 
Stephens, 2001; Milanovic, 1999; Przeworski and Gandhi, 1999; Bradley et al., 
2003).  The differences between the three kinds of welfare state regime are evident 
also in the analysis of longitudinal data by Goodin et al. (1999). 
Table 1. Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes 
 Liberal Social 
democratic 
Conservative 
Role of:    
Family Marginal Marginal Central 
Market Central Marginal Marginal 
State Marginal Central Subsidiary 
Welfare state:    
Dominant mode of 
solidarity 
Individual Universal Kinship; 
Corporatism; 
Etatism 
Dominant locus of 
solidarity 
Market State Family 
Degree of 
decommodification 
Minimal Maximum High (for 
breadwinner) 
Degree of defamilialisation Medium High Low 
Extent of redistribution Low High Medium 
Source: Esping-Andersen, 1999: 85, and supplementary data. 
The ‘three worlds’ typology has, however, been criticised on a number of grounds. 
 Many criticisms concern the categorisation of non-modal cases, including 
Australia and New Zealand, Japan, the Mediterranean cases (Italy, Spain and 
Portugal), the Netherlands, Britain, and even France and Belgium (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 86-94).  The precise categorisation of individual cases is of little 
concern to us here.  More pertinent are criticisms that the typology fails to address 
other determinants of inequality, such as gender differences and household/family 
dynamics.  Some welfare regimes reduce individuals’ dependence on kin as much 
as (or more than) on the market; in others, families continue to play a leading role 
in caring for children and the elderly, and male bread-winners are assumed to 
support dependent women.  Welfare regimes in Southern Europe (Italy, Spain and 
Portugal) and in Japan are said to be ‘familialistic’: they offer strikingly fewer 
public services that substitute for the family; many more elderly people live with 
their children, and many more unemployed people live with their parents; in 
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Southern Europe, although not in Japan, women work more unpaid hours (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 63). 
While Esping-Andersen (1999) recognises some of these weaknesses in his earlier 
work, he defends his typology.  He rejects the ‘familialistic’ criticism on empirical 
grounds.  Overall, he claims, the regimes of Southern Europe do not provide 
markedly less support to families than other conservative regimes in continental 
Europe (ibid: 93-4).  He is less willing to concede the criticism made by Castles 
that his typology underestimates the importance of labour-market policies 
designed to influence wages (and thereby earnings) – but he presents curiously 
little evidence for his rejection.  He thus mis-categorises some countries that 
achieved distributional goals through regulating labour-market earnings rather than 
supporting incomes through state welfare transfers.  Castles has shown that in 
Australia, the material well-being of the citizenry was secured primarily through 
the regulation of earnings through, especially, the wage arbitration system 
(Castles, 1985, 1996; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; see also Esping-Andersen, 1999: 
89).  Indeed, perhaps the most important of the state’s social policies was 
assistance with housing for working people.  The result was, in Castles’ phrase, a 
‘wage earners’ welfare state’, i.e. a welfare state that sought to ensure a certain 
standard of living for Australians as (male) wage-earners (and their dependants) 
rather than as citizens.1  Esping-Andersen (1999: 90) concedes that the Australian 
(and New Zealand) cases differed from other liberal welfare regimes, although 
they differ less so now, in the aftermath of market-oriented reforms.  But he is 
unwilling to recognise these as a distinct ‘world’ of welfare capitalism, arguing 
instead that they still form, in essence, a variant of the liberal welfare regime.  
Other comparative scholars (e.g. Huber and Stephens, 2001) are, however, 
persuaded by Castles’ arguments, and use his ‘four worlds’ typology. 
The ‘three worlds’ typology was developed for, and continues to fit reasonably 
well, the advanced industrialised countries of Europe and North America.  It fits 
less easily the later industrialising countries of Southern Europe, Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand (see Esping-Andersen, 1999: chapter 5).  It fits even less easily 
the countries of Latin America and East Asia that industrialised still later, or the 
                                                 
1  Castles and Mitchell (1990) point out that Esping-Andersen is more concerned with equality of 
status than income equality, i.e. with the status-conferring aspects of public policy rather than the 
distributional effects in terms of income.  Esping-Andersen focuses on ‘decommodification’, 
which renders citizens equal in terms of status but has more ambiguous effects on the distribution 
of income.  As he himself writes: ‘We should not confuse the welfare state with equality’ (1996: 
261). 
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post-Communist countries of central and Eastern Europe.  In an edited collection 
including chapters on each of these three groups, Esping-Andersen and his 
contributors avoid developing his typology (Esping-Andersen, 1996).  There is, 
indeed, no mention of welfare regimes.  Instead, he discusses the trajectories that 
these cases are following.  Most (including Chile) are following a liberal, market-
oriented strategy.  Others (e.g. Brazil), have taken tentative steps towards 
universalism (along what he later calls a ‘proto-social-democratic path’ – ibid: 
267).  A third group (in East Asia) have followed the Japanese lead in combining 
great emphasis on both the family and employment-related welfare; public 
provision is residual, although the model relies on a de facto job guarantee.  In his 
1999 book, Esping-Andersen briefly examines Korea and Taiwan along with 
Japan, but does not even mention Brazil, Chile or Poland. 
A typology in which welfare capitalism is categorised into ‘regimes’ in the 
countries of the North but into ‘trajectories’ in those of the South, is clearly 
incomplete.  Firstly, Northern ‘regimes’ are themselves in flux (as Esping-
Andersen himself shows).  Secondly, there is no reason to believe that the paths 
being followed by southern economies will lead them to the same regimes as did 
the paths already followed by northern economies.  (The comparable assumption 
that Southern economies had to replicate the growth experiences of Northern 
economies was roundly criticised in development studies).  Late industrialising 
countries such as South Africa, Brazil, India and Korea are clearly capitalist.  They 
might not spend anywhere near as much on public welfare as even the liberal 
welfare regimes of the North, but their spending is not insignificant, and they 
generally invest heavily in other areas of social expenditure, especially public 
education.  In a few cases, including South Africa, the state’s social policies are, by 
some measures, highly redistributive.  Southern states may have made clear 
decisions to rely more heavily on market or family, and may have directed state 
policies in these directions.   
Unfortunately, there is little research on the experiences of ‘welfare capitalism’ in 
Southern societies.  The one set of cases that have attracted most research in this 
vein comprises the East Asian ‘tigers’.  Many of the scholars concerned have 
emphasised how they don’t fit the Esping-Andersen typology (which, Jones 
remarks, is ‘very much a Western welfare capitalist typology’).  Jones (1993) and 
others have argued that the East Asian cases comprise distinctively ‘Confucian’ 
welfare regimes.  Esping-Andersen’s response is that the Japanese case, and 
presumably the Korean and Taiwanese ones too, falls into the conservative 
category (1999: 91-2).  Latin American welfare systems have attracted 
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considerable attention, although not so much within Esping-Andersen’s 
framework.  In much of Latin America, government spending on the welfare 
system is high, in relation to either total government spending or GDP, but it is 
rarely redistributive.   
Elsewhere, perhaps, levels of capitalist development and state intervention have 
been considered too low to warrant analysis in terms of ‘welfare’ capitalism.  
Certainly, most studies of the incidence of taxation and public expenditure in the 
South reveal a picture of very limited – even zero – redistribution from rich to 
poor.  Because public expenditure is often captured by non-poor groups, Gini 
coefficients for the distribution of income are not reduced by anywhere near as 
much as in the industrialised democracies of the North.  Even taking into account 
the benefits ‘in kind’ from social spending (especially public education and 
health), Gini coefficients are rarely reduced by more than 5 to 7 percentage points, 
which is substantially less than in the North. 
Pro-poor forms of capitalism in the South have generally not emphasised social or 
labour market policies as much as a broader set of developmental policies.  These 
forms of capitalism might be described as ‘developmental’ more than ‘welfare’, 
and the states as ‘developmental states’ rather than ‘welfare states’.  Policies 
shaping the economic ‘growth path’ – and thus the overall level and pattern of 
income – through broader economic policies have not been entirely neglected in 
the literature on distribution in the North (see especially Huber and Stephens, 
2002, for an analysis of how different welfare state regimes are ‘embedded’ in 
different production regimes), but they have never been accorded an importance 
comparable to their importance in the ‘development’ literature on the South.  
Since the 1970s, development economists have conducted many cross-national 
studies that show that growth strategies had profound effects on ‘who gets what’ in 
these societies.  The pioneers in this (e.g. Adelman and Morris, 1973; Chenery et 
al., 1974; Lewis, 1976) were followed by multi-volume projects.  These included: 
the ILO’s “Income Distribution and Employment Programme” (with studies of, 
inter alia, Hong Kong [Hsia and Chow, 1978] and Mexico [Van Ginneken, 
1980]); Princeton’s series on the “Political Economy of Income Distribution in 
Developing Countries” (with studies of, inter alia, Turkey [Ozbudun and Ulusan, 
1980], Nigeria [Bienen and Diejomaoh, 1981], Egypt [Abdel-Khalek and Tignor, 
1982] and Mexico [Aspe and Sigmund, 1984]); and, most recently, the World 
Bank’s series on the “Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth” (edited 
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by Lal and Myint, and including studies of Brazil and Mexico [Maddison et al., 
1992] and Costa Rica and Uruguay [Rottenberg, 1993].  Whereas Esping-
Andersen takes the market-generated distribution of income largely as given and 
concentrates instead on how welfare states redistribute that income, development 
economists emphasised the relationship between growth and distribution.  Put 
another way, analysis of the South must encompass both the direct and indirect 
ways in which the state shapes distribution.  
Income inequality might be expected to change as the economy ‘develops’, 
independently of the particular policies of the relevant government.  This was the 
argument put forward by Kuznets (1955, 1963), and typically explained in terms 
of the Lewis model of development (Lewis, 1954).  As Lewis himself later and 
others argued, however, different growth paths have different implications for 
inequality and its trajectory over time (Adelman and Morris, 1973; Lewis, 1976).  
It is the distinctiveness of their growth paths, and of the policies that made these 
paths relatively egalitarian, that is the key characteristic of the East Asian welfare 
systems, according to White and Goodman (1998). 
Extending Esping-Andersen’s analysis to South Africa or other Southern societies 
suggests that different worlds of welfare capitalism are characterised by packages 
of welfare, labour market and ‘growth path’ policies.  These may be functionally 
interlocking, as are (in general) welfare and labour market policies in the North.  
Elsewhere, in a case-study of South Africa, Nattrass and I use the concept of a 
‘distributional regime’, combining (often uneasily) welfare, labour market and 
growth path policies (Seekings and Nattrass, forthcoming).  In the South African 
case, diverse policies promoted a growth path that increased inequality, by 
rewarding people with skills whilst reducing opportunities for the unskilled.  
Figure 1 sets out the main components of a distributional regime. 
Analysis of an entire distributional regime requires a large canvas.  It would need 
to cover not only social policies, but also the impact of industrial and agricultural 
policies (including policies that shaped prices such as tariff policies and policies 
affecting the marketing of agricultural produce), the ways in which earnings were 
shaped by public policy (including through the design of wage-bargaining 
institutions), policies on land ownership and alienation, and policies affecting 
access to housing.  This paper does not attempt to consider ‘distributional regimes’ 
in their entirety, but rather focuses very specifically on the state’s efforts to 
maintain income security.  In short, it focuses on welfare regimes. 
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Figure 1: Key Elements of a Distributional Regime 
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3. Developing a Typology of Welfare Regimes 
in the South 
Early cross-national work on welfare systems in the world examined the 
relationship between the level of economic development (measured in terms of 
GDP per capita) and public expenditure on welfare.  Cutright (1965) and Wilensky 
(1975) showed that there was a correlation between these variables (see Figure 2). 
 But there are a number of problems with this approach.  First, when we examine 
different welfare regimes in the middle-income Southern countries, we see a more 
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deviant pattern (see Figure 3): Latin American cases have much higher levels of 
spending in relation to GDP than do East Asian cases.  The relationship between 
economic development and welfare provision is much less clear when we consider 
the most interesting Southern cases, and the choices that Southern countries have 
made.  Secondly, the level of spending tells us nothing about the distribution of 
benefits within the population.  High spending might not be pro-poor (as is in fact 
the case in much of Latin America), whilst low spending might be very well 
targeted on the poor (as might be the case in Hong Kong, perhaps).  It seems that 
there is, in the South, little relationship between either overall spending and 
income security or development and spending (or income security). 
One of Esping-Andersen’s key insights was that levels of spending alone provide 
an inadequate basis for categorising welfare systems in the North.  His central 
argument was that it is not so much the level of spending that is important as the 
extent to which the welfare system ‘decommodifies’ the citizenry, treating them as 
bearers of shared rights rather than owners of individual (or perhaps corporate) 
assets.  Esping-Andersen developed an analysis in terms of the respective roles of 
state, market and family.   
This approach has some appeal in the South.  For one thing, given the relative 
youth and weakness of both the (modern) state and the market in much of the 
South, the family has historically played a very important role.  The family is the 
provider of default: the World Bank estimated in the early 1990s that only 30 
percent of the world’s elderly are covered by formal arrangements, and only 40 
percent of the world’s working population participate in any formal arrangements 
for their future old age (World Bank, 1994).  Moreover, many Southern countries 
stipulate in statute or constitution that the family must provide for its members.  
The 1987 constitution of the Philippines declares that ‘the family has a duty to care 
for its elderly members’ (Section 4, Article XV (15) cited in Ofstedal et al. (2002): 
66).  The 1995 Singapore Maintenance of Parents Act requires children to support 
their parents (ibid: 67).  Similar statutory obligations exist in, inter alia, India and 
Botswana. 
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Figure 3: Economic development and welfare public expenditure, 
















GDP per capita  
 14  
Secondly, the family/market/state separation allows us to distinguish between the 
classic Latin American and East Asian welfare models.  The Latin American cases 
typically involved a massive state role, including heavy subsidisation out of 
general revenues.  The East Asian cases historically entailed a larger emphasis on 
the market (supplementing the family); the Latin American cases are more 
inegalitarian in that they entail more state subsidisation of the already privileged 
formal sector employees (see Figure 4).  But this orthodox distinction blurs some 
basic similarities between the Latin American and East Asian models.  In both 
settings, the rights or claims that people can make are dependent on their prior 
employment status (see Figure 5).  In other words, rights are dependent on prior 
commodification.  This is the case regardless of whether the claims are exercised 
through social insurance or through state-regulated market systems of risk-pooling 
or saving.2  White and Goodman (1998: 14) describe the East Asian cases as 
‘similar to what Esping-Andersen (1990) calls “Bismarckian” welfare systems’: 
state-sponsored, but occupationally-fragmented schemes that reflect and reinforce 
differences in status and power.  This is a description that readily fits most Latin 
American cases.  In contrast, Southern welfare regimes can entail 
decommodification, through the recognition of rights, i.e. through social assistance 
rather than social insurance.  A typology of Southern welfare regimes needs to 
distinguish between those entailing claims based on employment and those 
entailing rights of citizenship.  This is especially important in the South because 
the population in formal employment is generally relatively privileged, i.e. has 
incomes close to or above the median income.  A welfare system that ties benefits 
to formal employment is likely to exclude most of the poor. 
                                                 
2 A broader analysis of the distributional regimes would need to pay attention to the pro-poor 
policies pursued by East Asian states through other mechanisms than welfare policy. 
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Figure 4: The role of the state, market and family in welfare systems, 











Figure 5: The role of the state, market and family in welfare systems, 
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There is, in the South, a third alternative to employment-based and rights-based 
welfare.  In many settings, Southern states have sought to promote income security 
through access to land.  Land reform programmes, and ensuing government 
support for small farmers, can provide poor families with the opportunity to 
produce for either their own consumption or for the market.  It does not seem 
appropriate to consider such agrarian policies as entailing either commodification 
or decommodification. 








Figure 6 shows a three-fold typology of Southern welfare regimes that is 
consistent with the spirit of Esping-Andersen’s project.  It distinguishes between 
agrarian, inegalitarian corporatist and redistributive regimes.  Agrarian regimes 
are defined by the private provision of welfare, dependent on access to land and/or 
kin; such access to land and/or kin is itself dependent on a set of supportive state 
policies.  Inegalitarian corporatist regimes are defined by achieving income 
security through forms of risk-pooling and/or saving that are dependent on 
employment.  The label ‘inegalitarian corporatist’ is clumsy, but is intended to 
draw attention to both the corporatist element (with claims dependent on 
membership of occupationally-defined corporate groups, as in the European 
conservative or corporatist welfare regimes) and the fundamentally inegalitarian 
character given the exclusion of the poor from formal employment and hence 
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membership of these corporate groups.  Given the role of formal employment in 
this regime-type, an alternative label would simply be ‘employment-based’.  These 
regimes come in two versions: the more market version (either provident funds as 
in Singapore etc, or employer-based schemes as in much of East Asia until 
recently) and the more statist one (formal social insurance).  Finally, the 
redistributive regimes are defined by their recognition of citizens’ rights to income 
security through, especially, non-contributory social assistance.  These three kinds 
of Southern welfare regime can be considered in the same framework (see Table 2) 
as Esping-Andersen’s three Northern regimes (see Table 1 above). 
Table 2. Typology of Southern Welfare Regimes 





Role of:    
Family Central Marginal Marginal 
Employment Marginal Central Marginal 
State Varied Varied Central 
Welfare state:    
Dominant mode of 
solidarity 




Dominant locus of 
solidarity 
Family Market or state State 
Degree of 
decommodification 
Varied Minimum Maximum 
Degree of defamilialisation Low Varied Medium to high 
Extent of redistribution Varied Low Medium to high 
There are grounds for considering a fourth kind of welfare regime.  In Islamic 
societies, especially, charity is a mechanism for maintaining minimum incomes 
separate from the market, the state or kin.  Pending further research on the scale of 
income support through non-kin charitable activities, however, I will stay with a 
three-fold typology. 
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In practice, the welfare systems in countries combine elements of two if not all 
three of these kinds of regime.  In South Africa, for example, there is a large 
employment-based social insurance system, including both risk-pooling and 
individual savings, providing for the employed elite; there is an impressive set of 
non-contributory social assistance programmes, including especially old-age 
pensions; and there have been some (very inadequate) attempts to revive 
smallholder production and an agrarian society.  Most countries therefore fall in 
the space within the triangle in Figure 6.  But where they fall within this triangle 
varies.  Some cases, including South Africa, are closer towards the redistributive 
corner; others, such as Kenya, are firmly in the agrarian corner; the Latin 
American cases are mostly in the inegalitarian corporatist corner.  Over the past 
twenty years, however, more and more countries have been moving in the 
direction of the redistributive corner, even if they are not yet close to the corner 
itself. 
It is important to re-emphasise that all three of these regime types entail active 
state interventions of one sort or another.  Agrarian welfare regimes cease to be 
‘welfare’ regimes in any meaningful sense if the state does not provide support 
with infrastructure, marketing, tax and tariff policy, and even land reform.  Figure 
6 might be better understood with an additional dimension, representing the 
‘traditional’ family-based economy and society, prior to the great expansion of 
both states and markets in the twentieth century.  Societies shift from this 
historical, family-based origin to some position on the triangle in Figure 6 as states 
and markets develop and transform the social and economic world. 
A number of factors appear to be especially important in the pace and direction of 
this process of change. 
1. Is there an immigrant working-class (as in Australia, South Africa, Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile)?  If so, there is more likely to be a rapid move towards 
non-universal corporatism (i.e. mix of state plus market), whether because 
of direct pressures from below or pro-active reforms from above. The 
importance of the immigrant working-class is that it lacks links to a 
productive peasantry (and might also bring socialist or trade unionist 
ideologies and traditions). 
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2. Is there an agrarian crisis, i.e. deagrarianisation?   And if so, is this 
considered irreversible, or might it be thought possible to revive an 
agrarian society and economy? 
3. Is the economy open or closed?  An open economy precludes employers 
passing on the costs of social insurance onto consumers, and encourages 
state and employers to consider seriously social assistance programmes 
funded out of central government revenues.  (For this reason, powerful 
employer-worker coalitions might push for tariffs, ISI etc). 
4. What is the relative salience of universal rather than employment-based 
norms of welfare provision?  Is the country more exposed to the influence 
of the ILO or the British liberal welfare tradition? 
5. Is there electoral competition for votes of non-unionised poor?  This 
requires a degree of democratisation.  Competition for the votes of the 
non-unionised poor provide an important stimulus to the promise of non-
contributory social assistance, because the non-unionised poor are 
unlikely to be able or willing to be covered by a contributory system. 
Underlying this analysis is a key difference between societies in the South and 
those in the North (at least in the early twentieth century).  In the North, the 
establishment of social democratic welfare regimes followed in part the formation 
of a ‘red-green’ alliance, i.e. between urban, industrial workers and small farmers.  
In the South, there are much deeper differences between these classes, and there is 
a third constituency – of landless, jobless poor – to consider.  Small farmers want 
land not welfare (resisting some intrusions by the state whilst welcoming others); 
the urban industrial working class want welfare but do not want to share it; and the 
non-unionised poor historically lack power (and often lacked even the vote). 
Four key stages can be identified in the development of Southern welfare regimes. 
 First, in the early twentieth century, industrial and public sector workers struggled 
for or were given insurance-based welfare.  Unionised immigrants were especially 
prominent in this struggle for state-subsidised risk-pooling.  Outside of these 
specific occupations, poverty was the concern of kin; only in exceptional 
circumstances did the state accept the need for state-funded social assistance to 
‘deserving’ poor (often through discretionary poor relief).  Here lay the origins of 
inegalitarian corporatist or employment-based welfare regimes.  Secondly, in the 
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mid-twentieth century, concerns with agrarian crisis and ensuing urban poverty led 
to reform in one of two directions: the predominant response was the 
‘developmental’ one (with an uneasy combination of economic modernisation and 
social traditionalism, such that poverty is more effectively addressed by kin or 
through the extension of risk-pooling among wage-earners), leading to the 
formation of agrarian welfare regimes; a less common response was the extension 
and institutionalisation of social assistance, leading to redistributive regimes.  In 
the second half of the twentieth century there was a widespread broadening of 
inegalitarian corporatism, with insurance systems extended to cover a broader (but 
still very incomplete) section of the population.  Finally, at the end of the century, 
a combination of demographic change, massive deagrarianisation and (especially) 
democratisation increased pressures for welfare reform and the extension of 
income security to the poor through non-contributory social assistance. 
4. Immigrant Workers and the Politics of 
Industrialisation in the Early Twentieth Century 
In urban and industrial areas across much of what was later to become known as 
the ‘South’, as in what was to become the ‘North’, welfare systems were born and 
grew primarily through the establishment of contributory insurance schemes for 
particular groups of workers.  The groups with most power and influence were the 
same in most settings: soldiers, civil servants, and workers in key sectors such as 
railways, ports and utilities.  In some cases, these groups of workers secured 
protection through direct action.  In others, elites provided protection to pre-empt 
such action.  Insurance schemes developed more in those settings where the 
workers were immigrants, sometimes drawing on socialist or other ideologies from 
their countries or origin, and always with weak or no links to the agrarian economy 
outside of the towns and industrial areas.  Typically, these occupational groups 
obtained favourable welfare provision at the same time as favourable economic 
policies (such as ISI). 
Brazil is a classic example of this (see Malloy, 1979).  Brazil’s welfare system had 
emerged in the 1920s in response to the industrial (but not electoral) strength of 
sections of the working class, in formal employment in key sectors.  Prior to 1923 
public sector workers secured some social insurance.  In 1923, state-enforced, 
compulsory social insurance (covering retirement, sickness and invalidity) was 
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introduced for private sector railway workers, later extended also to dock and 
maritime workers.  The scheme was funded through contributions from 
employees, employers and the state.  Unlike in South Africa, there was no 
supplementary social assistance covering those who had not contributed to the 
social insurance schemes.  After 1930, under Vargas, an elaborate system of social 
insurance was extended to cover most of the urban, formal sector – i.e. 
approximately 2 million workers by the late 1930s.  A substantial number of 
working people was thus covered by a state-subsidised welfare system.  
Chile is a broadly similar case (see Borzutzky, 2002).  In Chile, the military and 
civil servants secured pension systems in the nineteenth century, and railway 
workers in 1911 (expanded in 1918).  After some debate, and under pressure from 
the military (who were wielding de facto power), the Chilean Congress established 
in the 1920s a compulsory pension system for blue-collar workers, covering 
retirement, disability and sickness, together with separate new funds for civil 
servants, the army, the police and white-collar workers.  Welfare provision was 
contributory, and was organised along occupational lines.  Employers and 
employees paid contributions.  These initiatives were largely pre-emptive on the 
part of the elite.  Copper workers, for example, only formed their first trade union 
in 1925, using labour legislation introduced under military pressure at the same 
time as the social security legislation the previous year. 
Over the following years, the Chilean welfare system became even more 
fragmented along occupational lines, as smaller groups secured their own, separate 
funds or secured special privileges in larger ones.  There were eventually about 
160 separate funds, and a much larger number of relevant agreements, statutes and 
regulations (Borzutzky, 2002: 49-50).  The better-paid workers secured better 
welfare provision; poorly-paid workers inferior benefits; and workers outside of 
the formal sector not at all.   
The result in Chile, as Borzutzky argues forcefully, was structured inequality.  
Indeed, as Huber (1996: 143-4) notes for Latin America in general (citing earlier 
work by Mesa-Largo), ‘these schemes did more than reproduce the inequality in 
the labour market; they aggravated inequality by imposing some of the burden of 
financing on groups not covered, mainly through indirect taxes and through the 
passing on of employer contributions to prices in protected markets.’  Formal 
sector workers and existing employers were protected by tariff barriers erected to 
support strategies of industrialisation through import substitution (ISI).  ISI meant 
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that employers could pass onto domestic consumers both higher wages and the 
cost of employer contributions to social security.  Workers in the protected, formal 
sector benefited, workers in the informal and rural sectors paid higher prices 
(Huber, 1996: 146).  In terms of both their political origins (reform from above) 
and their occupationally-structured inequalities, these Latin American welfare 
regimes were similar to the conservative or corporatist regimes of continental 
Europe (Huber, 1996: 148).  Unlike the European cases, however, these regimes 
excluded the poor.  Whilst corporatist, these regimes were therefore doubly 
inegalitarian.  The most fragmented and inegalitarian cases were those that had 
established their programmes early in the century (Huber, 1996: 143). 
Amidst this picture of inegalitarian social insurance, there are two deviant (and 
generally neglected) cases:  Uruguay and South Africa.  In Uruguay, the core of 
the welfare system was corporatist, with social security for army, civil servants and 
other labour aristocracies.  But, from the 1910s, social insurance was 
supplemented by social assistance.  I am unclear as to precisely why, but one 
factor was electoral competition between the Blanco and Colorado parties.  In 
South Africa, also, the core of the welfare system was corporatist, with a variety of 
contributory schemes for white and ‘coloured’ workers in formal employment.  
But, in 1928, the South African state introduced non-contributory old-age pensions 
for white and coloured people, and later extended this social assistance to include 
grants for the disabled and for single mothers. 
Prior to the 1920s, in South Africa, there were pensions for special groups such as 
war veterans (and their dependents after their death).  Otherwise, the burden of 
support was on kin (with a common law requirement that children support parents) 
and poor relief on the British model.  In the 1920s, immigrant white workers 
flexed their political muscles, through both direct action (including the ‘Rand 
Revolt’ of 1922) and the ballot box, with the (socialist) Labour Party and 
(Afrikaner nationalist) National Party forming the ‘Pact’ government in 1924.  
Demands for unemployment insurance and old-age pensions led to a series of 
official initiatives.  The thinking of the time was set out in a 1924 Memorandum 
on the Subject of an Old Age Pension Scheme for the Union of South Africa.  The 
memorandum reviewed the options, distinguishing between voluntary schemes (as 
in France and Belgium), compulsory insurance (as in Germany) and (limited) non-
contributory schemes (as in New Zealand and Britain).  The arguments for non-
contributory schemes were ‘(a) the increasing stress of modern industrialism and 
the competitive system throwing, as it does, men out of employment at an ever 
earlier age; (b) the lowness of wages leaving no margin for making adequate 
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provision for declining years.’  These were issues related to urban poverty, and the 
concern was for poverty among a racialised and privileged group.  White workers 
may have espoused some aspects of socialist ideology, but their solidarity rarely 
crossed racial lines.  When MPs spoke of rights, of ‘moral obligation’ to provide 
for the poor, and for South Africa to do what many other countries had done, they 
were thinking of white (and coloured) men and women.  The general assumption 
was that the state might have an obligation to ensure that white (and coloured) 
workers enjoyed a civilised standard of living, but African people were to rely on 
their own, kin-based resources. 
In 1926, the South African government appointed the Pienaar Commission on Old 
Age Pensions and National Insurance, ‘to examine and report upon: (a) The 
payment of pensions by the State to necessitous aged and permanently 
incapacitated persons who are unable to maintain themselves and for whom no 
provision at present exists, (b) a system of National Insurance as a means of 
making provision for the risks of sickness, accident, premature death, invalidity, 
old age, unemployment and maternity.’  The commission’s three reports (1927-29) 
provided the foundations for South Africa’s welfare regime.  The First Report, on 
old-age pensions, noted that ‘many aged and infirm people are living under 
conditions which are unworthy of a civilised community’.  Children were often 
unable to care for their kin, driving too many poor to become ‘callous and 
hardened professional beggars’.  The report recommended a non-contributory, 
means-tested old-age pension and disability grant.  Non-contributory old-age 
pensions were introduced the following year.   Introducing the legislation, the 
Minister of Finance noted that ‘thirty years ago old age pensions were a novelty. 
…[But] today there are about forty such schemes in operation in various parts of 
the world’.  He continued to argue that ‘it is the duty of the state to come to the 
assistance of our aged poor’.  A contributory system would be of no use to those 
who are already old or who would reach pensionable age before making sufficient 
contributions, so a non-contributory system was required.  MPs generally agreed 
that ‘natives’ (i.e. African people) should be excluded.   
The second and third reports of the Pienaar Commission covered contributory 
systems to address old age, sickness and unemployment.  The ensuing contributory 
systems were similar to their Latin American counterparts except that they covered 
unemployment (for contributors).  As in most of Latin America, ISI meant that 
employers could pass on costs to consumers.  But, unlike Latin America, this 
social insurance system existed alongside the social assistance one.  In 1936 as 
many as 56 000 elderly white and coloured men and women were receiving the 
 24  
non-contributory pensions.  Whilst the South African system shared with its Latin 
American counterparts the exclusion of the poor majority, it needed to include 
some groups who were unable to provide for themselves on a contributory basis, 
i.e. poor white and coloured people.  They needed to be included because of the 
prevailing racist and Afrikaner nationalist ideologies, and because 
deagrarianisation among these groups meant that they could not be provided for 
through agricultural production.  Indeed, many of the ‘poor whites’ were 
immigrants into towns from farms, former sharecroppers and tenants squeezed off 
the land by the spreading commercialisation of agriculture.  
In sum, these exceptional cases appear to be ones where the electoral strength of 
non-unionised poor pushed governments to extend the welfare system beyond 
better-paid workers.  In South Africa, competition between the South African 
(later United) Party, the Labour Party and the Afrikaner nationalist parties had the 
same effect as competition between the Branco and Colorado parties in Uruguay: 
social assistance for some poor people, who were detached from the land and 
vulnerable to unemployment, sickness or old age.  
5. War, Rural Crisis and the Developmental 
Moment 
The welfare systems of the 1920s and 1930s were to be overtaken by events, 
especially war, in the 1940s.  The 1940s were a period of extraordinary intellectual 
ferment: in Cape Town, Nairobi and Mexico City, just as in London, Paris and 
Stockholm, politicians and administrators and intellectuals alike were infused with 
new confidence in the capacity of the state to promote the welfare of its citizens 
and subjects.   
The most radical innovation was the idea that a minimum income was a right of 
citizenship, alongside guaranteed health care and education.  In New Zealand, the 
election in 1935 of a Labour Party government led to the provision of a universal 
old-age pension under the 1938 Social Security Act, as well as subsequent 
reforms.  In Britain, the 1942 Beveridge Report formulated the doctrine of 
addressing the ‘five great evils’ (poverty, poor health, ‘ignorance’, inadequate 
shelter and unemployment) through a combination of welfare reforms, the 
 25  
establishment of a national health service, improved public education and the 
maintenance of full employment.  The Beveridge Report has a worldwide impact, 
prompting official commissions of inquiry into welfare reform across the British 
Empire, in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa, India, Ceylon (Sri 
Lanka), the West Indies (Jamaica etc) and Canada.  The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), also, influenced by Beveridge, redoubled its efforts to 
promote the public provision of welfare.  The ILO adopted Recommendations on 
Income Security and Medical Care at its 1944 conference in Philadelphia.  The 
ILO had a big impact in Latin America, where it held a series of regional 
conferences (in Chile in 1936, Cuba in 1939, Chile again in 1942, Mexico in 1945 
and Brazil in 1947).  Whereas Beveridge and the Anglo liberal tradition 
emphasised the rights of citizens (most famously expressed by T.H. Marshall), the 
ILO promoted the rights of workers.  This was to have an effect on the shape of 
welfare reform. 
The New Zealand Social Security Act, Beveridge Report and ILO efforts had great 
influence in part because of the impact of the Second World War.  Article 5 of the 
1941 Atlantic Charter committed Allied governments to the objective of ‘securing 
for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security’.  
Other ‘allied’ governments of the world promised a future free of insecurity and 
poverty through post-war ‘reconstruction’.  Even in racially-segregated South 
Africa: the wartime government declared that ‘there will be no forgotten men’: the 
spectres of ‘want, poverty and unemployment’ would be ‘combated to the best of 
our ability’; ‘the restoration after the war of the status quo ante is neither possible 
nor desirable…  everything practicable must be done to ensure a better life for all 
sections of the population’; ‘the native population also, both rural and urban, 
[would] participate in the enhanced well-being which it is desired to secure for the 
community as a whole’ (see Seekings, forthcoming). 
Such was the extent of popular enthusiasm around the prospect of welfare reform 
that the South African Prime Minister, General Smuts, expressed concern in his 
private correspondence.  ‘I don’t like all this preoccupation with the post-war 
paradise on earth which makes us all concentrate less on the war and more on 
schemes which confuse and divide us’, he wrote to a friend in London; ‘It is here 
[in South Africa] very much as with you [in Britain], where people talk Beveridge 
instead of war and Hitler’.  There was, he worried, a ‘real danger of people 
pushing the idea of the war and its early conclusion into the background, and of 
escaping into dreams of the better world to come – so much pleasanter a vision 
than this terrible task of fighting the war to a finish’. 
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In the less industrialised parts of the British Empire (and the Colonial Office in 
London), the Beveridge Report encouraged changes in policy that were already 
underway.  The ‘welfare’ of colonial subjects began to be taken seriously, in light 
of evidence on malnutrition and poverty (e.g. Hailey’s 1938 African Survey and 
the 1939 Report of the Committee on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire), unrest (as 
in the Caribbean and Mauritius in 1937-8) and the value of good wartime 
propaganda.  The 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act made more 
funding available, as well as marking an important discursive shift in colonial 
policy.  In 1942, the influential Hailey used his Report on Native Administration 
and Political Development in British Tropical Africa to endorse emphatically the 
colonial state’s role as ‘an agency for the active promotion of social welfare’, and 
the following year he wrote that ‘Our modern appreciation of the need for 
supplementing private initiative by state action has been reinforced by the fuller 
recognition of the function of the state as an organisation for promoting the 
economic welfare or safeguarding the standards of living of the population.  That 
is a doctrine which has now been projected from domestic into colonial policy.’  
The shifting policy reflected the heightened influence in Britain of the Fabian 
Society, unconventional academics (such as Margary Perham and Audrey 
Richards) and the Labour Party.  Across British colonies, ‘social welfare officers’ 
were appointed.  War thus served as ‘midwife’ to what Low and Lonsdale (1976) 
called a ‘second colonial occupation’  
Welfarist discourse was incorporated into the constitutions as well as legislation of 
many of the new states being established in the post-war world.  The Chinese 1947 
constitution, for example, committed the state to the maintenance of full 
employment, a social insurance system, social relief for the elderly and other 
groups, a national health service and free primary education (Ku, 1997: 32-3).  The 
Korean constitution of 1948 proclaimed that ‘those individuals incapable of 
working due to the old age, illness or other reasons shall be protected under law by 
the state’ (Article 19, quoted in Kim, 2004). 
This concern for ‘welfare’ could be realised in very different ways, however.  This 
was the moment of emergence of both ‘agrarian’ and ‘redistributive’ welfare 
regimes in different Southern settings, whilst ‘inegalitarian corporatist’ regimes 
also grew and developed under the impetus of the new concern with 
‘development’ and ‘welfare’.  All three are kinds of Southern welfare regime.  To 
begin, let us contrast the emergence of an agrarian welfare regime in Kenya with a 
redistributive welfare regime in South Africa. 
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South Africa (as we saw above) established parallel systems of social insurance 
and assistance for white and coloured workers in the 1920s and 1930s.  In the early 
1940s, a series of inquiries culminated in proposals for an expanded and 
transformed but still dual system: a non-racial system of social insurance for 
‘civilised’ African, as well as coloured and Indian people, alongside white people, 
and a residual system of social assistance for poor African men and women, in 
rural as well as urban areas.  What was revolutionary about this proposal was the 
inclusion of the rural poor.  Whilst it was argued that ‘Natives in the Reserves have 
shelter and can eke out an existence so that they do not need the elaborate cash 
benefits indispensable for a civilised community’ and ‘native custom provides for 
the maintenance of those who are old, ill, or orphans’, it was also recognised that 
‘overcrowding of the Reserves, primitive farming methods and low unskilled 
wages make this increasingly difficult’.  The total cost of the new scheme was put 
at about 7 percent of the GDP.  The proposals enjoyed support from industrial 
employers, including the politically powerful mine-owners, although they were 
opposed by the National Party (then in opposition).     
The proposals were implemented partially and unevenly, but in 1944 the old-age 
pension and disability grant were extended to African people in rural and urban 
areas.  Benefits were lower in rural than urban areas, and were lower for African 
than for coloured or white pensioners.  But the principle and practice of public 
provision of welfare for the deserving poor of all races had been established.  By 
1958, there were more than 270 000 African pensioners, as well as about 160 000 
white, coloured and Indian pensioners (out of a total population of about fifteen 
million people).  Discriminatory benefits meant that African pensioners received 
less than one-quarter of the total benefits paid out.  But, with the total social 
assistance package costing about 1 percent of GDP, this was not an insignificant 
allocation to the poor.  
The settler colony of Kenya entered the 1940s without any real welfare system for 
white settlers, presumably because there had never been a strong white working-
class or a white urban poor demanding public welfare schemes.  In Kenya, 
officials took it as self-evident that Beveridge’s proposals were inapplicable in the 
colonial context.  A different, paternalist form of ‘social welfare’ should be 
implemented in their place: welfare officers would rebuild family life among 
‘detribalised’, urban African people and promote ‘community development’. 
These welfare officers later became ‘development’ officers.  Initially, colonial 
officials saw themselves as the defenders of the egalitarian values of a (mythical) 
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pre-colonial “Merrie Africa”; later, they embraced economic change, encouraging 
African peasant production of cash and especially export crops (Lewis, 2000).   
Why did South Africa go down a different path to Kenya?  The crucial difference 
was the depth of rural poverty in South Africa and the apparent improbability of 
addressing this through rural development policies; production was well below 
subsistence levels even in good years.  In Kenya, officials could look to family and 
communal ties to ensure that the rural poor were supported out of agricultural 
production, whether for subsistence or the market.  Such ties also meant that social 
insurance was unnecessary.  Insofar as there was a growing problem of landless 
poor without kinship support, the solution was deemed to be economic growth, 
including especially secondary industry. South Africa, on the other hand, was 
plagued by labour shortages, and officials and employers did not want to draw 
labour back from the ‘modern’ sector into peasant agriculture, even if the latter 
was viable.  Social assistance meant that living standards could be maintained 
without upward pressure on wages, so reforms even enjoyed the support (or at 
least quiescence) of the more politically influential employers (or ‘fractions’ of 
capital). 
South Africa was not the only case of a (nascent) redistributive welfare regime at 
this time.  Two other examples were Mauritius and some of the British colonies in 
the Caribbean (or ‘West Indies’).  Most of the islands concerned were dominated 
by large agricultural estates, especially sugar cane estates, with a large and mostly 
landless rural proletariat.  In Mauritius and Trinidad, the rural poor were Indian 
workers, brought to work in the sugar industry decades earlier.  In both cases, the 
pressure for old-age pensions arose from rising poverty in contexts where 
shortages of land (due to land ownership patterns and population growth) 
precluded an agrarian solution.  Domestic political pressures, through riots (in the 
West Indies) or electoral pressures (in Mauritius) combined with the progressive 
intellectual environment globally and deagrarianisation locally. 
In much of the Caribbean, the prospects for re-agrarianisation were limited by the 
power of landowners, precluding land reform. Many poor households 
supplemented wages from what they grew on small plots, but there was little scope 
for building a genuine peasantry because of the constraints on land reform 
(Macmillan, 1938).  In July 1937, ‘disturbances’ began in Trinidad and Barbados, 
followed by Jamaica and the smaller islands.  In 1938 the British government 
appointed a West Indies Royal Commission (the Moyne Commission) to examine 
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the causes of the riots and recommend appropriate policies.  The Commission 
found that ‘the diets of the poorer people are often insufficient and usually ill-
balanced, although nutritious foods of all kinds necessary for health can be 
produced without much difficulty in almost every West Indian Colony. … The 
reason for this appears to lie fundamentally in the divorce of the people from the 
land without the provision of compensatory arrangements which would help to 
ensure adequate food supplies for the displaced population’ (quoted in Havinden 
and Meredith, 1993: 198).  Wages were too low for one person to support a 
household.  The Royal Commission, however, saw the problem as social as much 
as economic: ‘The bulk of the populations of the West Indies have lost their 
original cultures, and constructive efforts to provide a satisfactory alternative are 
long overdue’ (quoted in Smiley, 1946: 28).   
In the aftermath of the riots, colonial officials had quickly introduced non-
contributory old-age pensions in Trinidad and Barbados.  The Royal Commission, 
however, preferred an approach that combined agricultural development with 
social services, rather than cash payments. Development and social services 
together would serve the modernist project of creating a new culture.  Thus grew 
the concept of ‘development’ that informed much colonial thinking, including 
attempts to revive agrarian societies in Kenya and elsewhere, as well as social 
interventions in towns.  The Royal Commission recommended the appointment of 
a Social Welfare Officer in each colony (this later becoming policy throughout 
Britain’s colonies, as we saw above).  These officers developed schemes to instil ‘a 
spirit of self-help, self-respect, and self-determination.  People were encouraged, 
under tactful leadership, to form themselves into associations, clubs, or 
committees, for the discussion of problems of mutual interest, and joint action to 
overcome them’ (ibid: 200).  Where an agrarian society could be reconstructed 
along ‘modern’ lines – as, perhaps, in Jamaica – then the introduction of pensions 
might be avoided. 
Mauritius was the third case of non-contributory social assistance being 
introduced.  Old-age pensions were first introduced in 1950, with a means test that 
was later abolished.  Like Trinidad, Mauritius was a small island dominated by the 
sugar industry, administered as a British colony.  No less than 43% of the island 
was planted with sugar cane, and the industry accounted for between two-thirds 
and three-quarters of all employment, depending on the season.  Poor Mauritians 
‘ate or starved according to the price of sugar’ (Titmuss and Abel-Smith, 1961: 9). 
 Low sugar prices in the 1930s resulted in unemployment and malnutrition, and 
hence growing demands for poor relief.  In 1937, as in the West Indies, strikes and 
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demonstrations intensified into riots, with widespread sabotage of factories and 
arson in cane fields.  The report of the ensuing Commission of Enquiry was very 
similar to the Moyne Commission Report on the West Indies, attributing the riots 
to the economic and social pressures on landless workers vulnerable to 
unemployment.  It recommended, in general terms, old-age pensions and sickness 
insurance for all (Hooper Report p.168, quoted in Titmuss and Abel-Smith, 1961: 
85).  In 1940, the Governor appointed a Social Insurance Committee, which found 
that the ‘old system’ of welfare provision, based on the family, had broken down 
(unpublished report of the Social Insurance Committee, quoted in Titmuss and 
Abel-Smith, 1961:85).  Unlike in South Africa and the West Indies, however, the 
colonial administration in Mauritius was slow to act. 
The next spur to action was the prospect of funding under the Colonial Welfare 
and Development Act.  In implicit acknowledgement of the widespread currency 
of new welfarist thinking, the Governor urged caution: Mauritius should not just 
adopt ‘some one or other of the precise plans now being discussed elsewhere’ 
without paying careful attention to the ‘limiting factor’ of finance, given the 
Mauritian stage of development.  ‘We should be deceiving ourselves if we thought 
that we could launch grandiose schemes of social security in this island before we 
had examined the implications of the problem …’ (quoted in Titmuss and Abel-
Smith, 1961: 88).  Whilst the administration prevaricated, and the effectiveness of 
kinship-based poverty alleviation declined in the face of unemployment, so ever 
larger numbers of poor applied for poor relief, i.e. discretionary expenditure for the 
sick and destitute disbursed under the island’s poor laws. 
The final factor tipping the balance to social assistance seems to have been 
political.  After drawn-out deliberation, a new constitution was finally introduced 
in 1948.  The new Legislative Council would have an elected majority, with a 
wide literacy-based franchise.  In the 1948 election campaign, the Mauritian 
Labour Party campaigned on a platform inspired in large part by its British 
counterpart: social security and old-age pensions, compulsory education, housing 
and limited nationalisation (Simmons, 1982: 105).  Although the Labour Party did 
not secure control of the Council, primarily because the Governor used his power 
to appoint a slew of conservative members, it seems that the party had sufficient 
strength enough to push through a series of pro-poor policies, including the old-
age pensions in 1950; it is likely that the Governor acquiesced, not wanting to defy 
the progressive wave too far.  Electoral pressures remained important after 1950.  
In July 1953, just weeks before the next elections, the qualifying age was reduced 
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and benefits increased, doubling total payments to pensioners (Colonial Office, 
1954b: 84).   
In Mauritius, the introduction of old-age pensions did not do away with the need 
for discretionary poor relief, mainly for the sick (and, it was argued, some not-so-
sick unemployed poor); indeed, rising destitution resulted in larger sums being 
disbursed through poor relief than through the old-age pensions in the mid-1950s. 
In the face of rising unemployment and rapid population growth, two official 
commissions of inquiry in 1960 (one comprising Richard Titmuss and Brian Abel-
Smith, the other chaired by James Meade) recommended further reforms of social 
policy.  Titmuss and Abel-Smith recommended the introduction of a social 
insurance system (with wage-related contributions but fixed-rate benefits, a 
National Health Service and the extension of the non-contributory social assistance 
system to include family allowances).  The logic of public welfare expenditure was 
made explicit by Meade et al., ‘To increase employment, and constrain poverty, 
what was needed was wage restraint with a social wage, so that improved living 
standards did not mean increased costs to the employer’ (para 2.24; Meade et al., 
1961: 12).  ‘In the conditions of Mauritius low wages (to stimulate expanded 
employment) plus a moderate dose of social-security benefits or cost-of-living 
subsidies (to support the standard of living) together make up a very sensible 
policy’ (para 2.26, ibid: 13).   
Social assistance was introduced in Mauritius in part because of the absence of any 
major social insurance system providing for employed people.  This was in turn in 
part due to the fact that Mauritius, like Trinidad and Barbados, was a small, open 
economy, heavily dependent on the export of a commodity whose price was set 
externally.  Employers were unwilling or unable to pay higher wages or 
contributions to insurance or pension funds (as the colonial administration and 
Meade et al. recognised).  Where an economy could reasonably expect to grow 
behind tariff barriers, through ISI, the costs of a contributory scheme could be 
passed onto domestic consumers.  This was not the case in an open economy.  
South Africa was also an open economy in one major respect, with direct 
consequences for the 1944 reform: the price of gold was set externally, making the 
gold industry sensitive to labour cost  in ways that was not true of some other 
industrial sectors that grew behind tariff barriers. 
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6. ‘Modernisation’ and the Broadening of 
Inegalitarian Corporatism 
Postwar development strategies in many countries revolved around ‘modernising’ 
the economy through expanding the modern, formal sector, especially through ISI. 
 Contributory systems provided for formal sector workers, so the growth of the 
formal sector meant that the coverage of social insurance schemes expanded across 
a wider section of the population.  At the same time, hitherto uncovered formal 
sector workers sometimes exerted pressure on the state to include them, whilst 
politicians sought new groups of clients.  By the mid-1960s, over 60 percent of the 
economically active population in Chile was covered by social security 
(Borzutzky, 2002: 51), and the situation was similar in Argentina (Huber, 1996: 
143).  Packard (2001) shows that the growth of coverage was uneven across Latin 
America: in about 1980, it varied from a high of 50% or more in Argentina, Chile, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Costa Rica, to 30% or less in Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia 
and most of Central America. 
Broader coverage did not mean that systems became more pro-poor.  Most poor 
persons remained excluded.  Moreover, changes in the contribution and benefit 
arrangements may have meant that the systems exacerbated inequality even more 
than before.  Most of these social insurance schemes were heavily subsidised by 
the state.  In Chile, the state paid about one-third of all social security receipts in 
the 1960s; the proportion was lower in Brazil and Argentina (although it rose 
rapidly in the latter after 1980) (Huber, 1996: 153).  The Chilean state assumed 
more and more responsibility for financing social security through the piecemeal 
but steady award of concessions and privileges to powerful occupational groups.  
Employees’ own contributions declined, whilst benefits improved.  Better-off 
occupations paid the lowest contributions, as a share of earnings, and secured the 
most special privileges in terms of benefits.  The number of years of contributions 
required, the minimum retirement age, the ways in which benefits were 
determined, and accounting for inflation could all be manipulated.  Overall, white-
collar workers did better than blue-collar ones (Borzutzky, 2002: 55-60).  They all 
benefited at the expense of the excluded or uninsured.  A 1964 inquiry in Chile 
assessed that the uninsured paid 41 percent of the cost of social security through 
taxation and higher prices; a subsequent study in 1971 put the figure at 50 percent 
(Borzutzky, 2002: 56-7).  Because coverage was linked to industrialisation, the 
more industrialised regions enjoyed much better coverage than the more rural 
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ones.  ‘Thus, the social security system reproduced the existing distribution of 
wealth along socioeconomic as well as geographical lines’ (Borzutzky, 2002: 52). 
Welfare systems developed in this way because of the clientelism that dominated 
politics in much of Latin America.  Even in Chile, with its pluralist, multi-party 
system rather than an authoritarian leadership, the political parties competed in 
part on the basis of clientelism.   
During this time there were some attempts to extend coverage much more widely.  
The experience of Brazil is documented by Malloy (1979).  Here, as elsewhere in 
Latin America, reformers sought to unify the disparate existing social insurance 
schemes and, secondly, to extend coverage to unorganised and poorer sections of 
the population, either through social assistance or heavily state-subsidised social 
insurance.  The difficulty was that a substantial number of working people were 
covered by a state-subsidised welfare system, and had good reason to oppose the 
extension of the welfare system to other, poorer groups.  Their patrons in the 
political system had special reason to oppose reforms that removed their 
discretionary sources of patronage.  In Brazil, from the 1940s to the 1960s, reforms 
were repeatedly initiated by technocrats but thwarted by coalitions of politicians, 
union leaders and privileged worker groups (especially bank, railway and maritime 
workers).  This was the fate of, for example, the 1945 Vital Commission’s 
proposals for an integrated system of social insurance and social assistance, with 
standardised contributions and benefits, universal coverage and redistributive 
financing (based on the principle of ‘from each according to means, to each 
according to need’).  In Malloy’s assessment: ‘The bargaining over social 
insurance reform demonstrated that when the chips were down the trabalhistas 
would seek first and foremost to expand their own institutional bases of power and 
to meet the specific demands of their own rank and file even at the price of 
ignoring the needs of unorganised urban marginals and rural workers’.  Only in 
1971 did the military government bring rural workers under a non-contributory 
scheme paying minimal flat-rate cash benefits and funded out of a mix of taxes on 
rural produce and urban payrolls. By 1974, 93 percent of the population were 
covered by one or other scheme.  But coverage remained very unequal, in that 
formal-sector workers retained access to heavily-subsidised and very generous 
welfare schemes whilst low-paid rural workers were only eligible for the minimal 
flat-rate benefits. 
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This was the period also of emergence and growth of public welfare systems in 
East Asia.  The East Asian systems are generally contrasted with the Latin 
American ones, and there are significant differences.  Not the least of the 
differences is that East (and South-east) Asian schemes generally have defined 
benefits (Ofstedal et al., 2002), making them less inegalitarian.  But they shared a 
basic linkage of benefits to contributions whilst in formal employment, meaning 
that they do not reach the poor, and some of the Asian schemes are state-
subsidised (e.g. Thailand), making them regressive.  Indeed, the sequence of 
insurance system development in East and South-east Asia was often very similar 
to the Latin American precedent (but with a time lag, which was to be important 
later).  In the Philippines, public sector workers were covered by insurance 
schemes from 1936, whilst private sector workers had to wait until 1954 (ibid).  In 
Taiwan, social insurance was introduced for the military in 1951, was later 
extended to other civil servants, and only in 1980 was it extended to ‘labourers’.  
By 1980, coverage was only 14 percent; even in 1990, only 40% of the population 
were covered by schemes providing for old age and disability (Ku, 1997).  In 
Korea, pensions were introduced first for veterans and public officials; the system 
was, in Kim’s words, ‘hierarchical and conservative’ (Kim, 2004: 151). 
British colonies, in Africa as well as Asia, generally saw welfare systems develop 
around pension or provident funds; later, many of these were converted to social 
insurance (with strong support from the ILO).  Singapore’s Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) was established in the 1950s, with individual savings accounts; a shift 
to social insurance was subsequently proposed but rejected.  By 1990, two-thirds 
of the labour force was contributing.  The ‘neo-liberal’ reform of the Chilean 
welfare system, under military government in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
entailed a shift to a more individualised (and less state-subsidised) contributory 
system, not entirely unlike Singapore’s system. 
Amidst this flurry of construction of contributory systems, there were a few 
deviant cases entailing the construction of redistributive welfare regimes, or at 
least of redistributive, non-contributory elements of welfare regimes.  The British 
colony of Hong Kong introduced means-tested, low but non-contributory benefits 
to the poor and elderly in the early 1970s.  These were residual, and are often 
described in terms of a ‘liberal’ welfare regime (as in the UK, USA or Australia), 
but this residual social assistance was accompanied by highly redistributive 
spending on public education, housing and health care.  In Costa Rica, in central 
America, the welfare system expanded to the extent that Huber (1996: 159) 
describes it, perhaps rashly, as an ‘embryonic social democratic welfare state’.  
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Welfare in Costa Rica began as a classic case of inegalitarian corporatism, with 
pension funds for key groups of public sector workers, consolidated into a single 
social insurance fund in 1941 (under the influence of the ILO).  But in the 
1960s/70s coverage broadened considerably, and social assistance was introduced 
in the 1970s to cover those who were excluded from the contributory system.  
Non-contributory benefits remained very low, and contributory pensions remained 
earnings-related (with special deals for teachers, especially), so this was far from 
an egalitarian model.  (Health care was more genuinely universal and egalitarian).  
Finally, in Brazil, the military regime finally succeeded in extending non-
contributory old-age pensions to rural workers.  Some studies point to mobilisation 
among rural workers, and demands for land reform (Barrientos, 2003: 5), but this 
reform was implemented whereas previous reforms were blocked because the 
military were able to over-ride opposition (Weyland, 1996).  Overall, this was not 
an encouraging period for redistributive welfare reforms.  In South Africa, whilst 
the apartheid state never abolished the non-contributory old-age pension for 
African people, it did limit severely expenditure by keeping benefits low (and 
increasing the ratio of benefits paid to white relative to black pensioners). 
7. Demographics, Democracy and Social 
Citizenship at the End of the Twentieth Century 
From the 1980s, in countries across the South, pressures for reform of the welfare 
system came from a range of factors.  Population growth and deagrarianisation 
resulted in rapid increases in the numbers of poor people in towns or otherwise 
detached from the land. Globalisation might have accentuated the vulnerability of 
many groups to poverty.  Trade liberalisation also eroded the ease with which 
employers could pass on the costs of their social security contributions to the 
consumers.  At the same time, fiscal pressures compelled states to reassess their 
subsidisation of social insurance schemes, especially in Latin America.  Most 
importantly of all, democratisation strengthened the non-unionised poor.  Political 
parties began to use promises of pro-poor welfare reform as a platform to build 
electoral support.  Elections politicised welfare provision.  The collapse of ISI 
models of development and the shift to more open economies might, perversely, 
have made it easier to consider tax-funded welfare reforms rather than 
contribution-funded ones. 
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In Taiwan, only 40 percent of the population was covered by social insurance 
schemes in 1993.  Social assistance was a municipal responsibility, and was 
therefore very limited.  In 1993, when the opposition DPP promised a universal 
old-age pension, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) copied or matched the promise.  In 
the face of electoral competition, means-tested old-age pensions were introduced 
in 1993, with pensions of up to US$120 per month.  Universal health insurance 
was introduced in 1994; although contributory, the government pays the 
employer’s contribution if there is no employer.  In 1995, special pensions were 
introduced for small farmers.  Many municipalities give additional grants to the 
elderly (see Ku, 1997, 1998; Aspalter 2002; Ofstedal et al., 2002). 
In South Korea, an old-age pension system was introduced in 1988 because of 
promises made in the elections the previous year; the system had in fact been 
legislated in 1973, but never implemented (Kwon, 1998, 2002).  Prior to that, only 
workers in key economic sectors were covered by contributory pension schemes; 
otherwise, besides some paltry poor relief, the elderly had to rely on kin (and the 
state even funded relocation to rural areas).  But the 1988 scheme provided for 
pensions to be paid out only after at least fifteen years of contributions, so no 
pension benefits would actually be paid out until the early 2000s. Of more 
immediate importance was the extension, in 1988 also, of national health insurance 
to cover everyone (with the same provision for the state paying the employers’ 
contributions as in Taiwan).  More reforms followed in the mid-1990s, with what 
Kim (2004) calls ‘a major shift to a universal social security system’.  In the face 
of (unprecedented) unemployment, an Employment Insurance Programme 
introduced in 1995, as well as workfare and public works programmes (Kwon, 
1998, 2002).  The 1995 Framework Act on Social Security and 1999 National 
Basic Livelihood Security Act further marked a shift in policy away from simply 
employment-based claims (Kim, 2004).    
In Hong Kong, also, partial democratisation led to the extension of the existing, 
limited social assistance.  The existing schemes were re-established in 1992 as the 
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance and Benefit schemes, paying generous 
benefits to over half a million elderly and a further 160 000 poor households by 
1996. 
South Africa’s transition to democracy occurred at a time when, as we have 
already seen, a major set of social assistance programmes was already in place.  
Democratisation did lead, however, to further extensions in coverage and 
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generosity.  The first effect was on the level at which the old-age pension was paid 
once racial discrimination was eliminated.  In 1993, the National Party 
government, on the eve of South Africa’s first democratic elections, set parity at a 
generous level.  It is reported that the President, F.W. de Klerk, explicitly sought to 
be able to claim that he had set the pension at its most generous level, knowing that 
the incoming African National Congress (ANC) government would be under 
pressure to limit expenditures.  This is precisely what happened, with the ANC 
government allowing the real value of the old-age pension to decline by almost 20 
percent whilst it reduced the budget deficit (but the National Party’s move failed to 
prevent its decline into insignificance after 1994).  Secondly, the post-1994 
government presided over the extension of non-contributory pension payments in 
two areas: child support grants, to children in low-income households, and 
disability grants, including to people living with AIDS.  By early 2003, about six 
million people were receiving one or other non-contributory grants.  This number 
corresponds to one in seven South Africans, or more than one in four adult South 
Africans (and a higher proportion of households).  South Africa’s neighbour, 
Botswana, also extended its non-contributory old-age pension system in the late 
1990s. 
In Brazil, as in South Africa, democratic competition and the increased currency of 
progressive social ideas following the transition to democracy in the 1980s 
resulted in major extensions in the coverage of the public welfare system.  In 1991, 
a new non-contributory rural pension (the Previdencia Rural) was introduced. 
Successive reforms reduced the qualification age (60 for men, 55 for women) and 
increased benefits, did away with the restriction to particular sectors and to heads 
of households only.  There was no means-test and no activity test.  In urban areas, 
a new Beneficio de Prestacao Continuada (BPC) was introduced in 1993 to 
supplement the existing semi-contributory Renda Mensual Vitalicia (RMV); 
qualification for these urban schemes was more restricted than in rural areas, with 
strict means-tests and older qualification ages, whilst eligibility for the RMV 
required at least twelve months of contributions to social insurance.  By the end of 
2000, there were 4.6 million pensioners on the Previdencia Rural scheme and 0.7 
million on the BPC and RMV; together, the three schemes therefore reached over 
5 million pensioners, at a cost of about 1 percent of GDP (Barrientos, 2003: 5-6).   
A second area of non-contributory welfare provision in Brazil was support for 
low-income children.  In 1994, President Cardoso was elected on an explicitly 
progressive ticket.  In his inaugural address he emphasised that social justice 
would be the ‘number one objective of my administration’.  He claimed a mandate 
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‘from those that have been excluded’ and warned that, if necessary, he would ‘do 
away with the privileges of the few to do justice to the vast majority of Brazilians’. 
 The great challenge would be to decrease inequalities and do away with the 
‘patronage, corporativism and corruption [that] drain away the taxpayer’s money 
before it reaches’ its rightful beneficiaries (Cardoso, 1999).  The Cardoso 
governments (1994-2002) largely failed to reform the social insurance system, but 
the government did establish or expand several new federal welfare programmes.  
Most important was the Bolsa-Escola programme, which provided means-tested 
grants to poor families conditional on children attending school.  Initiated in the 
Brasilia Federal District in 1995, by the newly-elected Worker’s Party (PT, in 
Portuguese) governor, decentralised Bolsa-Escola (school scholarship) 
programmes had been implemented in perhaps one hundred municipalities by the 
end of 2000, reaching about 100 000 families, one quarter of them in Brasilia 
(Lavinas, 2001: 6).  Coverage was thus very limited, in terms of both 
municipalities and the poor in participating municipalities.  In Belo Horizonte, the 
programme reached 8% of families (ibid: 12).  Just prior to the 1998 presidential 
elections, the federal government launched a programme, meeting half of the cost 
of Bolsa-Escola programmes in poorer municipalities.  The government claimed 
that 504 000 families benefited over the following year (ibid: 7-8).  Assessments 
of Bolsa-Escola programmes indicate that they raise school attendance and reduce 
grade repetition, and are well targeted on the poor, but they barely scratch the 
surface of poverty (ibid; Lavinas et al., 2001).  In mid-2001, however, the Federal 
Bolsa-Escola programme was expanded, and by early 2002 reached nearly 5 
million families, including over 8 million children (Silva e Silva, 2002: 10).  In 
2003, President Lula launched the Bolsa Familia programme, to integrate several 
hitherto fragmented social assistance programmes, including Bolsa Escola.  In 
2004 the average benefit was the equivalent of US$25 per month per family; about 
5 million families were forecast to receive the grant during the year (Lavinas, 
2004: 9). 
The 1990s were an unprecedented period of expansion of welfare provision to the 
poor in many Southern settings.  Some of the reasons why are becoming clear.  
First and foremost must be the new electoral power of the non-unionised poor.  
With democratisation in Brazil, South Africa, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and 
elsewhere, political parties began to compete earnestly for the support of these 
poor voters.  But the ballot box seems to work more effectively for the poor if 
there is a poorly entrenched system of social insurance providing for workers in 
formal employment.  Reform was easier in East Asia, where contributory schemes 
were very recent, and the contributory pension scheme was still not paying 
pensions to elderly people, than in Latin America, where organised (and politically 
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powerful) groups of workers had major vested interests in the status quo (that 
meant state subsidies of their welfare).  Latin American states were not immune to 
pressures for reform: the collapse of ISI and the rise of globalisation increased 
poverty and removing the ease with which costs could be passed on, and at the 
same time states were under great pressure to pare back expenditure (and target 
social spending more effectively on the really needy). 
8. The Prospects for Basic Income 
There are grounds for optimism, even in surprising places.  The World Bank 
‘model’ is notorious for substituting publicly-managed social insurance with 
privately-managed individual savings and co-insurance schemes.  But the other 
public ‘pillar’ in the World Bank ‘model’ is publicly-managed social assistance, 
albeit with means-test and minimum benefits.  The implementation of this pillar 
would mark a major pro-poor reform in most Southern settings.  In practice, recent 
Brazilian and South African reforms are not far from this model, with means-
tested grants targeted on deserving categories of poor (poor families with children, 
the disabled, the elderly). 
Other grounds for optimism are clearer.  In South Africa, the Government-
appointed ‘Taylor’ Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social 
Security for South Africa recommended, in its 2002 Report, the gradual 
introduction of a basic income grant, with low benefits but paid to all South 
Africans regardless of means.  In Brazil, in January 2004, President Lula signed a 
law to introduce a basic income grant (renda basica), in stages.  Whilst the South 
African government has opposed the introduction of a basic income grant, and in 
Brazil the passage of a law does not preclude a very drawn-out process of 
implementation, there appears to be some momentum behind radical reforms of 
public welfare. 
But there are also grounds for pessimism.  The factors that frustrated Brazilian 
reforms for so long are still present, and not only in Brazil.  Writing about Costa 
Rica, Clark (2001: 9) contrasts the politics of ‘first-stage’ reforms (such as trade 
liberalisation and deregulation) with ‘second-stage’ reforms (including reforms of 
social security).  The winners from first-stage reforms often organise quickly and 
effectively, out-muscling the losers.  But, with second-stage reforms, ‘the political 
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fallout often outweighs potential gains.  The losers are represented by large public 
sector unions and professional associations while the potential beneficiaries of 
state reform, that is taxpayers and clients dependent on public services, are 
typically poor, unorganised and dispersed.  In this case, politicians and their 
reform teams might feel that there is little to gain by attempting second-stage 
reforms at all.’  In Costa Rica, teachers were a leading opponent of reform: their 
pensions were paid at 100 percent of their final salary, and they could retire at a 
low age if they so chose!  Unfortunately for the poor, it seems to be difficult to 
create the fiscal space for pro-poor expenditure without reforming any existing 
contributory system.   























This paper suggests that there are good reasons to expect welfare reform in a range 
of settings but not others (see Table 3 for a summary of some past experiences).  
Deagrarianisation and democratisation together result in powerful pressures for 
reform: competition for the votes of poor, landless citizens leads to promises of 
redistributive welfare.  Employers are more likely to be sympathetic in an open 
economy.  But reform is most likely in those settings where there are fewer 
obstacles, and that means settings where there is a weakly-entrenched system of 
social insurance with all of the vested interests that arise from it. Reform is more 
likely in the Koreas and Taiwans of the world than in Latin America. 
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